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Abstract.

Developmental

states

are

criticized

for

rapid

“industrialization

without

enlightenment.” In the last 30 years, China’s breathtaking growth has been achieved at a high
environmental and food safety cost. This article, utilizing a recent survey of China’s livestock
industry, illustrates the initiating role of China’s developmental state in the exponential
expansion of the country’s livestock production. The enthusiastic response of the livestock
industry to the many state policy incentives has made China the world’s biggest animal farming
nation. Shortage of meat and dairy supply is history. Yet, the Chinese government is facing new
challenges of no less a threat to political stability. Production intensification has created a
welfare crisis impacting the world’s biggest number of farm animals. The resulting food safety
incidents are affecting consumer confidence and health. Untreated waste contributes to the
nation’s environmental degradation. Developmental states may have a proud record of growth in
the initial stage of industrialization. Their prospects for sustained development have long been
questioned. China has come to an important juncture to march towards a sustained development.
Key words: China’s livestock production, developmental state, environmental degradation,
animal welfare, food safety, public health

Introduction

In September 2008, a shocking food poisoning incident electrified the Chinese public. A brand
name Chinese baby formula was blamed for the death of four infants and sickening 54,000
across the country. 1 What made the public more agitated was the revelation that the local
government concerned had tried to cover up the incident and to prevent the local media from
reporting it. Sanlu Dairy Corporation, the producer of the tainted formula, had by the outbreak of
1

See Zhou Tingyu et al (2008).
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the incident been a model business and one of the top dairy producers in China holding about
18% of the national dairy market share. Sanlu was a major revenue contributor to Shijiazhuang,
the capital city of Hebei province. The fact that this model business with hundreds of awards
ranging from an exemplary corporate member to a scientific innovator is now implicated in the
nation’s worst product safety case is thought-provoking. To the Chinese consumers, if this socalled model business could churn out poisonous products, are there socially responsible
corporations in China?
When reports on the incident finally emerged in a nearby province, the Chinese government
responded quickly and pointedly. The chief executive of Sanlu, a deputy to the National People’s
Congress, was detained. Also arrested were 27 dairy farmers and milk collection station
operators. The head of the national product quality bureau was forced to resign. Despite these
arrests, resignation, and heightened quality inspection of the dairy products on the markets,
public anger has been fermenting. Amid increasing public calls for holding government
accountable for the out-of-control food safety problem, the Chinese government has been trying
to channel public anger at the “small number of heartless entrepreneurs” and dairy farmers.
Official media has intensified reports of the government as the guardian of public safety. Wen
Jiabao, the prime minister, announced to the nation that he can be trusted to be at the forefront
whenever a crisis takes place.2 Food safety is a new challenge to political stability.3
China is a reforming Leninist Party-state. Despite market liberalization since the early days
of the reform, China has retained much state control over the nation’s economic life.
The blame on the individual dairy farmers and the milk collection center operators for the
tainted milk has been questioned. This paper uses a field study of China’s animal farming
industry and its growth in response to government policy incentives to illustrate the part of
China’s reforming state in the nation’s economic accomplishments and problems. We argue that
China’s worsening environmental, food safety, and public health problems have a lot to do with
the government’s reform politics. The Chinese government is as much a part of the food safety
problem as of a solution.
Structurally, this paper starts with an introduction of the developmental state. The review
focuses on its role in economic growth and its limitations in social progress. It establishes the

2
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See Zhang, Suo. (2008).
See Zhao, Shengyu (2003).
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Chinese reforming state as the explanatory variable of China’s livestock industry transformation.
In the next section, we shall introduce the results of our study of China’s livestock industry.
Emphasis is placed on the rate of the increase, structural change, and welfare conditions of the
farms investigated. Following the survey results, we shall trace the industry’s expansion to the
several landmark policy incentives. These were policies that jumpstarted farm animal production,
removed obstacles to industry expansion, and encouraged industry modernization. Finally, we
shall examine the new environmental and public health problems that have accompanied the
growth of the nation’s livestock production. We argue that, like all other developmental states,
the Chinese government’s obsession with growth explains the many growth ailments impacting
environment and public health.
Developmental State and Obsession with Growth

Developmental states are a unique group of nations conceptually positioned between the open
market economies and centrally-planned socialist states. In his study of “China as a
developmental state,” Andrzej Bolesta provides a good summary of the features of such states.
First, it is “a state in which the authorities’ objectives are to achieve fast socio-economic
development.” 4 Motivations behind the authorities’ focus on development can be economic
backwardness,

5

government legitimacy crisis and security threats. Backwardness forced

Bismarck’s Prussia and Japan in the mid-19th century to seek ways to catch up with the
industrialized nations so that they would not be left behind further. The Republic of China on
Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek faced the twin threats of internal revolt and invasion from the
Communist mainland in the early 1950s. Motivation for growth was understandably enormous
for Chiang.
Second, a developmental state is authoritarian. It maintains a competent bureaucracy
insulated from the society. Through the state bureaucrats, the developmental state “dictates not
only the norms and rules of the social, political, and economic existence, but also the directions
of development.” 6 It is therefore an interventionist state. Apart from the authoritarian
institutional setting and developmentalist ideology, developmental states take proactive approach
4

See Bolesta, Andrzej, (2007, p.109).
See Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
6
Bolesta, Andrzej. (2007, p.109).
5

4

to build a congenial policy environment for achieving the objective of rapid growth. Yet, unlike
the more predatory central planning socialist states, the developmental states act more as a
regulator and facilitator or in the characterization of Peter Evans as a “custodian,” “demiurge,”
“midwife” and “husbandry.”7 In these roles, developmental states regulate, assist, and motivate
the private sector, particularly the target industries to seize growth opportunities and face
challenges. Because of the effectiveness of government policies, one perspective sees
government policies as a comparative advantage in state’s efforts to promote growth or to shield
the national economy from adverse outside impacts.8
Third, despite its interventionist nature, a developmental state oversees a capitalist economy.
Private production and other non-state sectors are important contributors to growth. In East Asia,
private enterprises are known to respond quickly to signals of state policy change besides
opportunities created by a protected domestic markets. Unlike in a socialist centrally-planned
economy where the means of production belong to the state, a developmental state protects
private ownership. Government policies serve to define the perimeters of permissible corporate
behaviors like in liberal open economies, direct resources to state-defined priority sectors or
productions, and assist industry expansion and modernization. Admittedly, the state bureaucracy
must keep abreast of the world latest industrial progress to be able to guide growth in a desired
direction.
Fourth, in developmental states, civil society develops slowly. Building an open society and
democratic institutions is not a priority, still less in the initial stage of development. In Bruce
Cumings’s view, the East Asian developmental states should be construed as “bureaucraticauthoritarian industrializing regimes.” Laborers, students and intellectuals used to face
draconian laws against autonomous societal activities. Voices against state-led capitalist
development were often and sometimes brutally silenced.

9

“East Asia has meant

industrialization without Enlightenment, …”10 Underdeveloped civil society has shielded the
businesses from environmentalists and from consumers violated by problem products. Often,
national security and domestic stability are used as a justification for limiting civil liberties and
7

See Evans, Peter. (1995). Embedded Autonomy. p.14.
See for example,Krueger, Anne O. (1980); Loriaux, Michael (1991, p.34-38); Dalia Marin, Dalia (1995);
and Bradford, Jr., Colin I. (publication year unknown).
9
See Cumings, Bruce (1999). ‘Webs with No Spiders, Spiders with No Webs: The Genealogy of the
Developmental State.’ In Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., The Developmental State p. 70.
10
Woo-Cumings. Meredith. (1999, p. 90).
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restricting societal forces that are considered to have parochial interests and myopic concerns in
the way of the state’s growth-oriented development strategy.
Finally, developmental states are attracted to foreign advanced technology and production
models. States that are late to industrialize “ardently desire modern technology: it is their
passport to modernity, their membership card in the twentieth century.”

11

Therefore,

developmental states pursue an open door policy towards the industrialized West. While
efficiency and productivity can be achieved through foreign learning and adoption of foreign
advanced technology, modern Western attitude towards nature is also accepted. In his book
Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, Denis Goulet has the following comments
on the adverse impact of Western technology transfer:
Nothing is sacred to them (the technocrats): the earth, and nature itself, are there to be
mastered – and altered in the process. …While Western technology promotes certain
values of rationality, efficiency, and problem-solving, it also threatens or destroys other
key values when “transferred” to Third World countries.12
The reforming Chinese government is a post-socialist developmental state. 13 Economic
growth or, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, “developing productivity” was and is still the primary
objective of China’s reforming government. As a developmental state, how has China’s
reforming state pushed for production expansion of the nation’s livestock industry? How
successful have the government’s efforts been? In the next two sections, we shall first introduce
China’s animal farming industry and its changes in the last 30 years to gauge the effectiveness of
the state role. Following this introduction, we shall review the landmark policies that have been
adopted with the aim of facilitating livestock industry expansion.

China’s Livestock Production and a 30-year Growth

11

See Goulet, Denis. (1995, p.105-106).
Goulet, Denis. (1995, p.108)
13
See Deans, Phil (2004) ‘The People’s Republic of China: The Post-Socialist Development State’ in Linda
Low (2004, p.133-146).
12
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Increasing agricultural productivity was the top priority when the reforming Communist Party
leadership initiated the reform program in 1978. Since then, farm animal production, an
important part of the rural sector, has grown rapidly. Chinese peasants are known to be most
sensitive and responsive to changes of the government policies. The growth trajectory of the
nation’s livestock production reflects the interaction between state policies and industry
responses.
Growth, Diversification, and Product Structural Change

Meat output is indicative of the growth of China’s livestock production.

In 2006, China

produced a total of 78 million tons of meat, about 600% increase over that of 1978. In terms of
annual average growth, China maintained an impressive 7.6% increase rate in the last 26 years.
In contrast, worldwide meat production in the corresponding period grew at 3% per year only. In
1978, China’s meat production accounted for 7.8% of the world total. Its population in that year
represented 25% of the world’s total. In 2006, China’s share in world meat output rose to 29%.
This accomplishment was at a level commensurate to its share of the world’s population.
Table 1: A Comparison of Meat Production in China and in the World:1978 – 2004.
China
Year

Total Growth
(in over

million tons)

Previous Year

World

Total As(in% of the World

million tons)

Total

127.44

8.7

(in %)
1978

11.10

1979

13.35

20.27

132.69

10.0

1980

14.79

10.78

136.68

10.8

1982

16.44

6.47

140.58

11.7

1984

18.58

8.78

149.34

12.4

1985

20.94

12.75

154.42

13.6

1987

24.06

5.11

164.93

14.6

1988

26.70

10.97

171.21

15.6

1992

36.40

9.08

189.05

19.3

1993

40.54

11.37

194.05

21.0
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China
Year

Total Growth
(in over

million tons)

Previous Year

World

Total As(in% of the World

million tons)

Total

(in %)
1995

48.24

7.87

206.72

23.3

1997

54.72

13.9

216.08

25.3

1998

59.12

8.04

224.35

26.3

2000

63.19

5.26

235.06

26.8

2003

71.18

4.98

253.53

28.1

2004

74.43

4.56

259.37

28.7

Source: FAOSTAT 2005
Several points should be made about China’s livestock production figures in table 1. First,
despite the impressive average growth rate, we see vicissitudes in growth in the years included in
the table. Significant growth can be attributed to government actions in the year immediately
preceding the increase. The 20.27% growth in 1979, for example, was a positive response to the
new Party policy de-criminalizing non-grain production. Yet, in the next four years, average
growth rate of meat production was maintained at 6.86%. In 1983, it even dropped to 3.89% over
the previous year. According to a Chinese provincial agriculture bureau official, enthusiasm for
livestock farming cooled down. Peasants who intended to expand production were hesitant to
proceed while those who intended to enter the production were watching to see if they should
throw their limited funds into the production. One reason underlying the hesitation was the fear
that government policies could change. 14
The Chinese government saw the peasant’s wait-and-see attitude. It responded with new
policies to address peasants’ fear. The 1984 policies allowing the use of market price for farm
animal sales and state decision to reduce the number of farm products under state compulsory
procurement plan served as a further assurance to the peasants. The growth rates for 1984 and
1985 as a result went up to 8.78% and 12.75% respectively. Similarly, big output increase in

14

Interview with a provincial agriculture bureau official, June 14, 2005.
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1988 and 1993 happened as a result of the 13th Party Congress of 1987 and of Deng Xiaoping’s
famous 1992 speeches on the need to continue economic reform and opening to the outside.15
Second, the steady growth was achieved by both the modern farms and the millions of
peasant backyard farms. For example, in 1989, 93% of the peasant households in a southern
Jiangxi township raised on average 3 pigs, 21 ducks, 17 chicken (laying hens and roosters
combined), and 7 geese a year. Many peasant households had also been engaged in wildlife
farming such as frog, snake, civet cats, turtles and others to supply the markets in nearby
Guangdong, China’s wildlife eating capital. 16 Even though specialized livestock farming has
developed rapidly in the rural area, China’s animal farming by the end of 2003 had remained
dominated by scattered individual peasant household-run farms. In pig, dairy cow, beef cattle,
sheep/goat, layer and broiler farming, peasant household-based farms accounted for 93.77% of
the farm total producing 44.14% of the livestock slaughtered. And, 94.46% of China’s pig farms
were small scale operations owned by individual peasant families.17
In 2003, China had 101,963,901 such household-owned pig farming operations raising 1 to 9
pigs. They produced 52.86% of the pigs slaughtered in the year. Peasant farms represented
85.17%, 97.25%, 95.71% and 96.31% of the total number of the dairy cow, beef cattle, laying
hen and broiler farms.18 The fact that some one hundred million peasant households are involved
in animal farming should speak volumes about the peasant response to the Party’s call to
diversify agricultural production.
Third, what the table does not show is that China’s livestock production has undergone a
product structural change in response to proactive state initiatives and policy endorsements.
Today, pig farming continues to dominate China’s livestock industry. Yet, that domination is
eroding. In 1972 of the pre-reform era, for example, China’s total meat output was 9,614,701
tons. Pork accounted for 81.9% while poultry, beef, and mutton made up 11.4%, 2.39% and
1.40% respectively.19 Since 1978, the weight of pig farming has been steadily going down. A
comparison of the farm animal distribution in total livestock farming in 1978 and 2004 highlights
the changes in product structure.
15

For Deng Xiaoping’s speech on the need to continue economic reform and opening to the outside world,
see Chinese Communist Party Central Document Research Institute (2004, p.1341-1345).
16
Interview of southern Kiangsi officials of the prefecture animal husbandry bureau, June 17, 2005.
17
See China Animal Husbandry Industry Yearbook Compilation Committee. (2005, p. 225-237).
18
China Animal Husbandry Industry Yearbook Compilation Committee. (2005, p. 225-226).
19
UN FAO data.
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Chart 1: Comparison of Meat Production by Livestock (1978 v 2004)
Comparison of Meat Production By Livestock in China
(1978 v 2004)
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Data source: FAOSTAT, 2005.
In 2004, pork production topped the production list with its 48 million tons of output (out of
a total of 74 million tons) followed by chicken (9.8 million), beef (6.8 million) and sheep/goat
meat (3.9 million tons). Output of pork, poultry, beef, and mutton represented 65%, 19%, 9%,
and 5% of the total. Beef and mutton production has grown faster in recent years. For example,
beef and sheep/goat meat output increased by 7.88% and 10.58% over the previous year.20
Fourth, dairy production has expanded exponentially. China’s milk production since 1978
has grown at 9% on average. In 1978, it produced 2.8 million tons of milk, only 3 kg per person.
In 2004, milk production reached 22.9 million tons, an increase of 7.17 times over that in 1978.
Despite China’s population of 1.3 billion in 2004, per capita milk production went up to 17.6 kg.
In the first few years of the new century, milk production accelerated. It grew by 10%, 17%,
19%, and 26% in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. This pace of growth has slowed down a little
since 2003 as a result of industry consolidation and fierce competition for market shares. In 1978,
China’s milk production accounted for an insignificant 0.61% of the world total. That figure rose
to 3.7% in 2004. To the Chinese agricultural bureaucrats in Beijing, China has great room to
catch up with the advanced countries in milk production.

20

UN FAO data.
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By 2005, China had been the world’s biggest egg producer for 20 years. In 1985, it produced
5.5 million tons of eggs, 17.05% of the world total of 32.5 million. Since then, China’s
production and its share in the world total have ascended to a new level. In 1990, it produced 8.1
million tons, making up 21.79% of the world gross egg output. In 2000, its share went up further
to 40.9%. Four years later, China produced 45.04% of the world’s eggs.21
Looking back, 1978 represented a milestone in China’s egg production. Its growth rate was
most dramatic between 1987 and 2002. Per capita egg production in 2002 reached 18.71 kg, 8.28
times of that in 1962. In 1991, China’s per capita egg production exceeded world per capita
average. Four years later, China overtook the industrialized nations in per capita egg production.
Despite the fact that egg production has stabilized since 2002, the peak year of growth, the
growth rate is still maintained at a level significantly higher than that of the world and of the
industrialized nations (See chart 2).22
Chart 2: Per Capita Egg Production: China, Industrialized Nations, and World

Per Capita Egg Production (kg)
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Data source: China Animal Husbandry Industry Association
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Animal Farming in Rural Economy

Promoting livestock production with the aim of increasing its share in the rural output has long
been a policy objective of China’s reforming state. The share of livestock farming in the grainproducing regions grew most rapidly. Overall, China’s animal husbandry industry has increased
from 17% of the gross agricultural product in 1978 to 34% in 2004. Provinces with the highest
percentage of animal farming in gross agricultural production included three traditional and
seven non-traditional animal farming provinces. Even though animal farming in Qinghai, Tibet,
and Inner Mongolia accounted for 53%, 46%, and 40% of their respective gross agricultural
output, these big percentages were maintained because they were agriculturally less developed.
Chart 3 illustrates the “inroad” of livestock production into the grain-producing provinces.23 And
the “inroad” took place after the authorities’ repeated policy statements on the need to utilize
grain byproducts for livestock production.

23

Grain production has been stable in the top producing provinces since the mid-1990s. The top 8 grain
producers in China are Shandong, Henan, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Hunan, and Jilin. See
“Yield of Major Farm Crops by Region” in Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of
Statistics. (2000, p.121).
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Chart 3: Animal Farming as a Percentage of Total Agricultural Output (2004)

Weight of Livestock Farming in Rural
Output of Ten Provinces (2004)
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Data source: China Animal Husbandry Industry Association
Penetration of Intensive Farming Model

Like other countries late to industrialize, China is enthusiastic about adopting advanced foreign
technology and production models. Open policy is part of China’s reform strategy. This policy
encourages Chinese businesses to look to the industrialized nations, in the case of livestock
production, for fine breeds, joint ventures, production models, and productivity enhancing
farming tools. A 2005-2006 field study of 35 Chinese intensive farms we conducted confirmed
the Chinese attraction to the Western model of livestock production.24
These 35 farms were not chosen randomly. Yet, we made it clear to farm visit organizers in
the cities of our visit that we wanted to visit farms that were modeled on Western factory farms.
Peasant household farms were excluded. Since the research objective was to find out the
penetration of Western livestock farming practices in China, farms recommended by local
authorities did not constitute a self-selection problem. To Chinese officials, adoption of the
Western farming model was a proud sign of progress. They generally thought that farm animals
lived a much better life on the factory farms than on peasant backyard farms. They did not object
to show us how open they were to new technology and advanced Western model. Yet, we were
24

See Humane Society International and Compassion in World Farming. (2006).
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required to follow the standard quarantine procedures when entering and exiting the farms. The
study revealed both a fast-developing sector and one with significant side-effects in environment
and public health.
Farm Size, Ownership, and Share of Output

From the very beginning of the reform program, livestock production has been a predominantly
private peasant household-based operation. The Chinese reforming state has had no problem
with the private nature of the production. In fact, it was China’s developmental state that
legalized peasants’ private production. To the state agricultural bureaucrats, scattered small-scale
peasant household farms were, however,

a hindrance to the industry’s expansion and

modernization. As of the end of 2003, peasant household farms had maintained their dominance
in the total number of livestock farms. For example, 94.46% of China’s pig farms, as Chart 4
shows, were small scale operations owned by individual peasant families. In 2003, China had
101,963,901 such household-owned pig farming units raising 1 to 9 pigs. They produced 52.86%
of the pigs slaughtered in the year.
Chart 4: Peasant Household-based Farms and Share in Output (2003)

Share of Peasant Household Farms in total Farm
Number and Weight of Production in Total Output
(2003)
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Data source: China Animal Husbandry Industry Yearbook: 2004.
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Peasant household-based operations in dairy cow, beef cattle, laying hen, and broiler farming
accounted for 85.17%, 97.25%, 95.71% and 96.31% of the total number of the respective
farms.25 These backyard farms are small in scale hiring few or no outside helpers. Because of
small scale operation, these peasant families only selectively adopt modern farming techniques.
Some of the modern practices adopted include use of commercial feed, drugs for disease control
and growth promotion, and barren housing. Peasant household-based operations are perceived by
the government as a backward mode of production for its limited growth potentials and epidemic
control problems.
In 2003, intensive farms producing 50 pigs or more only represented 4.46% of the total
number of pig farms. Dairy cow farming was similar. Farms raising more than 21 cows only
made up 2.18% of the total number of the dairy farms. And, 85.17% of the dairy farms were
small-scale household operations with on average six dairy cows. Medium and large egg farms
are even smaller in number. Farms holding more than 2,000 hens (up to 500,000 and more) only
accounted for 0.22% of the farm total. Similarly, in beef cattle farming, medium and large farms
(farms that raise between 51 and 1000 and more cattle) only represented 0.33% of the total. In
farm numbers, intensive farms are the absolute minority.
Yet, intensive farms had a disproportionately big share in output and stock numbers. Even
though individual peasant household operations accounted for 93.77% of the farm total, the
6.23% intensive farms produced 55.86% of the farm animal products in 2003. Specifically,
96.31% of China’s broiler output was owned by peasant households. Yet, the 3.69% of the
intensive boiler farms produced 81.14% of the total for slaughter. Egg farms come next as the
most intensive operation. Egg farms of scale (0.22% of the farms) held 25.86% of the laying
hens. The 4.46% intensive pig farms produced in 2003 46.94% of China’s pigs slaughtered in the
year. And, 0.33% of the cattle farms produced 12.0% of the beef cattle.26 Greater production
capacity of these farms was made possible by a wholesale adoption of Western modern farming
techniques.

Popularity of Intensive Farming Practices

25
26

See China Animal Husbandry Industry Yearbook: 2004 ( 2005, p.225-226).
See China Animal Husbandry Industry Yearbook: 2004 (2005, p. 227-235).
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Despite the small number of intensive farms, the popularity of Western farming model and
practices in China is obvious. The 35 intensive farms we studied were located in three types of
provinces, i.e., developed coastal provinces (Liaoning and Beijing), major livestock producer
provinces (Sichuan and Inner Mongolia), and inland grain-producing provinces (Jiangxi and
Anhui). We had expected greater penetration of factory farming practices in the first two groups
of provinces due to their greater openness to the outside world and their big share of livestock
production in rural economy. The findings told a different story. Western farming practices have
even penetrated Jiangxi and Anhui, two of the most underdeveloped and inaccessible inland
provinces. The following four Western practices are singled out here to show their popularity
with the Chinese livestock sector.
Gestatation/Farrowing Crates. Gestatation and farrowing crates are the most popular farming tool
of Western invention. We noticed them in all 9 breeding farms. Two of these farms were in
inland Jiangxi and Anhui. Their wide use across the country is therefore no exaggeration. Sow
crates are popular because they ensure success of pregnancy and prevent breeding sows from
crashing the piglets. Productivity and efficiency are the attractions. No farm workers and owners
appeared to know that use of furrowing crates is to be phased out in European Union nations. 27
According to the manager of a Liaoning breeding farm, his sows were generally confined up to
150 days in standard crates.28 All the interviewees of the breeding farms referred to such modern
farming practice glowingly.
Battery Cages. Battery cages are another Western farming practice widely used on layer farms in
both the coastal and inland provinces. The smallest of the eight layer farms we visited had, at the
time of our visit, 4,000 laying hens while the biggest kept 200,000 birds. Each bird was confined
in individual cage of about 450 square cubic centimeters. To the Chinese livestock industry,
battery cages were “scientific” productivity enhancing tool.
In China, battery cages is a fit in any environment and in any housing facilities. They are
installed under asphalt felt-covered sheds erected in the middle of rented farmland; they are
installed in makeshift chicken house converted from the old workshops of bankrupt state-owned
factories; and they are installed in extremely dark and poorly ventilated old farmhouses. Stocking
27
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density on the egg farms vary. But, they are generally crowded. Most farms installed two tiers of
cages while some have three tiers. The large number of birds in one housing in Jiangxi makes the
indoor air suffocating. Because of high stocking density, de-beaking is practiced. Four of the
eight egg farms we studied conducted de-beaking, another practice of factory farms. Also
revealed was an average 10% of mortality rate per year on both the egg and broiler farms. Three
of the farms disposed of the dead hens in a way that could allow these dead birds to sneak into
the food market.
Mutilation and Early Weaning. Mutilation is a standard practice of factory farms. It mostly refers
to tail-docking, teeth-cutting, and castration. The objective of tail-docking and teeth cutting is to
reduce mortality caused by injuries incurred from fighting while castration is to eliminate boar
taint.29 Eight out of the nine breeding farms castrated male piglets without using anesthetics or
pain-killers. In China, castration is performed to allow faster growth and growth beyond estrus
rather than to eliminate the boar taint. Tail docking was done for the same purpose on eight of
the nine breeding farms. Tail-docking is usually done on the second or third day after the piglets’
birth. Similarly, beak trimming is widely practiced on Chinese intensive farms in all three
regions.
Common to most intensive farms is early weaning. Out of the eight pig breeding farms of our
investigation, seven farms wean their piglets in the 3rd and 4th week, or 21 to 25 days after birth.
Only one farm has a weaning date that is one week longer. Dairy cow weaning is significantly
earlier. Five out of the nine farms wean their calves in a matter of two or three days. These
calves are separated from their mothers and are individually kept. Four other farms wean their
calves in 4 to five weeks. These practices have one objective in mind, i.e., productivity and cost
reduction.
Substance and Drug Use. Use of industrial chemicals, human drugs, banned chemical
compounds, and anti-biotic in farm animal feed is no secret in China. Pigs, for example, have
long been fed Clenbuterol, a synthetic steroid, to increase lean meat. This so-called “muscle
creator,” “magic potion,” or “Armit mitserhem” can help pigs gain up to 100 kilograms in weight
in a month. It was also reportedly found in chicken feed for layers to produce more eggs and for
29
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broilers to grow faster. Little consideration is given by those who use this substance in feed to its
adverse impact on farm animals and humans. Increasing productivity by cutting in half or more
of the normal growth time is the primary target. Pigs that have bigger muscles and less fat can
sell at a higher price. Resorting to “science” to increase productivity is not a traditional farming
practice. Factory farms in the West have long been known to rely on a wide variety of growth
promoting substances.
Anti-biotic is another form of growth promoting substance that has been abused on Chinese
intensive farms. Workers at all 35 farms said that they used anti-biotic drugs “when necessary.”
To the intensive farms, “when necessary” covers a wide range of occasions such as when there is
the need for cutting growth time, preventing or controlling disease, and getting the animals ready
for transport to the slaughterhouses. You would think that “when necessary” happens very often
especially on most of the chicken farms and two pigs farms we visited where sanitation and
space allowance were a big problem. Stocking size in confined space has been positively linked
to livestock aggression, which creates potential injuries and disease outbreak.30 To preclude the
outbreak of a devastating epidemic, farm owners rely heavily on drugs. Drug residual level in
meat and dairy products often exceeds the minimum level allowed by relevant state regulations.31
High drug residue problem was confirmed by the interview we conducted of a broiler
slaughterhouse owner. “We have a drug testing lab. But, we do not perform tests on the broilers
brought to us by our clients who purchase the young birds from our hatcheries,” he answered. He
continued, “if we do the tests, all the chickens would not pass the test. And, we do not supply
Western restaurant chains such as the McDonald’s or Kentucky Fried Chicken. Nor do we export
our meats.”32 In other words, he had no problem finding small supermarket buyers for his frozen
chicken. As a report on livestock product quality states, profit drive was the main reason of poor
meat and dairy quality on the market.33
The growth of China’s livestock production and the industry’s profit drive are closely linked
to government’s policy incentives. Despite economic liberalization, a lot cannot be accomplished
without the endorsement of the Chinese government. In the following section, we shall highlight
the major policy initiatives that have underlain the changes of China’s animal farming industry.
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Policy Incentives for Livestock Production

The growth, product structural change and industrialization of livestock production are
attributable to policy incentives of China’s proactive reforming state. Agriculture was the first
target sector of the government’s reform program. The reforming government attached great
importance to rural development for its value in stabilizing the countryside and the entire nation.
For that purpose, the reforming state adopted more than 3,000 policies related to rural
development. In this section, we focus on the political rationale and the landmark policies that
highlight state’s facilitating role in the expansion of livestock production.
Food Security and Regime Stability

In 1978, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started the reform program, it was facing the
most serious legitimacy crisis. Mismanagement of the Chinese economy under Mao in the prereform era had created a totally deprived society. A policy-induced hunger claimed the lives of
some 30 million peasants in the early 1960s.34 In the rest of the Mao era, the Chinese nation had
never recovered from the trauma of the man-made disaster. The entire society was placed under
the most brutal rule of the “tyranny of scarcity.” Mass exodus to Hong Kong, the former Soviet
Union, and even North Korea happened throughout the pre-reform era.35 Beggary was common.
Villagers in the most devastated regions spent much of the slack seasons begging around the
country.

36

Compulsory state procurement of the rural products at prices set by the state

destroyed peasants’ production enthusiasm. State-rationing system through which urban
residents received their meager rations made China’s socialist state more repressive than NAZI
Germany.
Yet, “hunger breeds discontent.” Both within the CCP and without, dissenting voices against
Mao’s extremist collective policies began to appear soon after his death. In 1977, Deng Xiaoping
asked if people would continue to tolerate the perennial food shortage any more. A reform
program was therefore construed as the only way to restore the CCP’s legitimacy. The reform
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program,

a “Second Revolution” in the eyes of Western China watchers, was tasked to re-

establish the CCP legitimacy through economic growth and an improvement of the people’s lives.
Deng Xiaoping warned Party veterans who opposed policy change that the CCP would face
popular revolt if it could not deliver to the people a prosperous China, a promise it had made
during the Civil War (1946-1949).37
Policy Change and Policy Incentives

In the pre-reform era (1949-1978), China pursued an extremist centrally-planned development.
In the rural sector, peasants were members of the People’s Commune, China’s version of the
Soviet state farms. They worked on the collective farmland and were reimbursed for their labor
in kind or in money. What to grow, how much to hand in to the state, and how much to retain
were all determined in accordance with state plans. Each peasant household was allotted small
family plots for growing vegetables for their own consumption. Non-collective production
activities beyond what was necessary for family consumption were discouraged. Peasant
household production of non-grain sideline cash crops or of farm animals beyond family use
were condemned. In rural China, land was in the hands of the state, so were all other means of
production. Peasants were demoralized. Grain production, which had received much government
attention, stagnated. The result was stagnation of the rural production and a severe food security
crisis addressed above.38
Lifting Restrictions on Rural Production. The reform program was, therefore, aimed first to end
the nation’s food security crisis. The epoch-making 3rd Plenum of the CCP’s 11th Party Congress,
in launching the reform program, put forward the Draft Decision on the Several Questions on
Accelerating Agricultural Development. This policy document called for arousing the peasants’
production activism, allowing peasants to produce their chosen products on their private plots,
encouraging and protecting household sideline production, and raising the government
procurement prices of agricultural produce. The Plenum also accepted Deng Xiaoping’s proposal
that government should encourage some people, through their hard work, to get rich first. 39 Most
37
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relevant to this study, the Decision proposed to expand animal farming industry so that its share
in agricultural output, about 17% of the total rural production, could be increased. 40 It also called
for increasing beef cattle, sheep and rabbit farming, improving livestock breeds, and a maximum
use of the grassland.41While still emphasizing the importance of grain production, it, however,
put an end to the Maoist “grain production first” policy. Most significantly, the Decision
decriminalized diversified agricultural production by individual peasants.
Based on the Party Decision, the Agriculture Ministry issued its first comprehensive Report
on Accelerating the Development of Animal Husbandry Industry. The Report released in early
1979 emphasized the importance of increasing the share of grass eating livestock in farm animal
total and the share of beef and mutton in consumption. It also called for implementing
preferential policies to encourage peasants to raise more livestock. These incentives included
provision of grain as feed to animal farming households and of extra land for feed grain
production in regions with land abundance. The Report authorized the opening of rural livestock
wholesale market. In addition, it confirmed state’s decision to lift the ban on cattle slaughter so
as to allow for trade in beef cattle. Soon after, the government raised the procurement price for
some farm animal products.42 Peasant response to the Party-state’s initiative was stunning. In
1979, livestock production grew by 20.27% over that in 1978.
Disbanding Collective Farms. The liberalization policies at the 3rd Plenum had their limitations.
Yes, it was no longer politically risky for the peasants to engage in non-collective and non-grain
production on the private plots. Yet, the limited amounts of private plots each peasant household
was assigned could produce little in excess of what was needed for household consumption. On
average, every household could only raise one to two pigs utilizing vegetables grown in the
private plots. Even raising one pig required the use of other feed made of assorted wild plants.
Noticeably, the 3rd Plenum failed to break down the opposition of the Maoists in the leadership
who objected the abolition of the collective farms.43
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A breakthrough was made only after fierce internal struggles between the reformers and their
opponents. 44 In September 1980, the CCP Central Committee issued Questions on Further
Strengthening and Improving the Responsibility System in Rural Production also called
“Document 75.” This document officiated the dismantling of the People’s Communes, China’s
state farms, and started land distribution to peasant households. In return to the allocated land,
peasants were required under the contract responsibility system to repay in fixed amounts of the
produce to the state. Surplus was to be marketed by the peasants in the rural markets or utilized
for animal farming or other productive purposes to be determined by the peasants themselves. As
a result of the new policy, peasant households saw farm land allocated under their control
increase by ten folds or more depending on land availability. Such a sudden farmland increase
made it possible for peasants to engage in non-grain productive activities in a scale that they
could never even have dreamed about in the Mao era.
Land distribution provided the peasants with an important means of production to expand
livestock farming. Yet, in the next four years, farm animal farming increased by 4.39%, 6.47%,
3.89% and 8.78% in 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984.45 In contrast, grain output grew faster in 1982
and 1983, for example, by 8.3% and 8.4%. And when livestock production registered a bigger
increase (8.78%) in 1984, increase of grain output dropped to 4.91%. 46 Obviously, when the
peasant households were allocated farmland, staple food production, i.e., grains, was the top
priority to the peasants. By 1984, peasant fear of grain shortage was much alleviated. They
started to expand non-grain production by utilizing the farmland under their control.

Utilizing Local Conditions. China’s traditional animal farming region was located in the Western
and Northwestern provinces. These included Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang
and Tibet. This is a vast area with 4.3 billion mu (1 Chinese mu equals to 1/15th of a hectare) of
grassland holding 80 million livestock in 1980, 14% of the national total. The Agriculture
Ministry Report on Accelerating the Development of Animal Husbandry Industry proposed that
this traditional animal husbandry region should concentrate on livestock farming and return
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cropland to grassland. 47 Similarly, the Ministry recommended that grain-producing regions
should utilize crop stalks, bran and other grain byproducts to develop livestock industry. Unlike
the traditional animal farming region that was vast in area but sparse in population, the grainproducing provinces such as Sichuan and Shandong were densely populated. Surplus rural labor,
according to the Report, could be diverted to animal farming. Furthermore, the hilly slopes and
water systems in southern provinces should also be utilized for livestock and fish farming.
Apparently, with the stabilization of grain supply by the mid-1980s, China began to see nonstaple food items such as meat and dairy products as important part of food security. Chinese
officials believed that people who had meat on their dinner table were less discontented with
their circumstances.48 Therefore, the Chinese government saw the need to boost the nation’s nonstaple food production further to enrich the food baskets of the people.
To accelerate growth, the Party Central Committee and government called on local
authorities to tap the unique advantages and endowments of the regions under their jurisdiction.
In March 1981, the CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly endorsed and forwarded
the State Agriculture Commission’s Report on Actively Developing Diversified Production in the
Rural Areas. This Report called for utilizing the more than 1 billion mu of grassy hills, 200
million mu of coastal wetland, and crops stalks and bran from 1.5 billion mu of cropland. Based
on the belief that grain production was a precondition of livestock farming expansion, a Central
Committee notice on Questions regarding the Current Rural Economic Policy offered the
Party’s directives. The Committee argued that animal farming production should resort to
scientific use of animal feed. It agreed that the development of animal husbandry industry should
not adversely impact grain production.49
While livestock farming was expanding, the authorities took notice of environmental
devastation in the form of desertification caused by overgrazing in much of the northwestern
regions. In 1988, the Agriculture Ministry issued Implementation Measures for Carrying out the
State Council Decision on the Key Points of Current Economic Policies. For the first time,
government called for a gradual scaling down of farming activities in the overgrazed areas so
that grassland would not deteriorate to a point beyond repair. Importantly, the Measures
recommended moving cattle and sheep farming from the prairies of the traditional animal
47
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farming region to the grain-producing provinces.50 Similarly, the State Council in 1992 and the
CCP Central Committee in 1998 issued their respective policy directives on further developing
animal farming industry in the grain-producing regions.51 What followed was a steady increase
in the number of grass-eating livestock and in the share of livestock production in the total output
of the grain-producing provinces.

Removing Restrictions on Market. Removing obstacles that had suppressed the role of the
“invisible hand” was a main policy objective of the reforming Chinese state. One of the earliest
rural reform measures was the lifting of rigid state control of market and price. In the pre-reform
era, peasant households could sell farm animals on the rural markets after they had fulfilled their
obligations to the state. Yet, because of limited means and resources, individual peasant
households could not raise more than what was needed to be handed over to the state. As a result,
livestock markets were largely not oriented to the trading needs of the peasants. In the 1980
Agriculture Ministry Report on Accelerating Animal Husbandry Industry, the state allowed
peasants to trade farm animals and determine the transaction price by themselves. In January
1984, the CCP Central Committee made a more far-reaching decision to the effect that state
procurement of farm animals and animal products should reduce gradually with the increase of
livestock output. To encourage production, the Central Committee recommended the further
liberalization of the price of fresh and live farm animals in accordance to differences in seasons
and regions. When state procurement was still in place, the Central Committee agreed, peasants
should also be allowed to sell their products at prices determined by the market. These policy
measures were specifically aimed at promoting livestock production. Through the decision, the
Party expected quick results to end the nation’s short supply of meat and dairy products. 52
Noticeably, liberalization of state control of market and price continued in the mid-1980s. In
a joint report on promoting goods circulation in rural areas, the State Economic Structural
Reform Commission, Commerce Ministry, and Agriculture Ministry decided to further reduce
the number of farm products under state compulsory procurement. Soon, the state procurement
list was shortened from the original 21 to 12 items to still include such produce as rice, wheat,
50
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corn, groundnuts, rapeseeds, cottonseeds, and three kinds of cotton. Also, the produce that the
state purchased through a routine yearly order was reduced from 18 to 9. Still included in the
state’s special yearly purchase were live pigs, cattle hide, sheep wool, and others. No longer
included in the special purchase were goat pelts, sheep pelts, beef, mutton, and eggs. Peasants
could thereafter expand production of these products and market them for better price on the
market.
Chinese peasants had been victims of the vicissitude of the government’s rural policies in the
pre-reform era. They feared that the new liberalizing policies could not last. In response to that
fear, the joint report stated that only the State Council had the power to decide what produce to
be procured and purchased. It stated that the government would not expand the existing
procurement list. 53 On the contrary, the list was soon to be removed. In January 1985, the
Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued Ten Policy Measures on Rejuvenating
Rural Economy. According to this policy statement, from 1985 on, the state would end once and
for all the system of state procurement of agricultural products. This policy change suggested
that peasants could directly sell all their livestock products on the markets. Livestock production
in 1985 and 1986 was again most indicative of the enthusiastic response from the farming
community. The average growth of livestock production in those two years reached 11.03%.

Production of Scale and Industrialization. Modernization of livestock production has received
consistent attention of the reforming state. Chinese reformist officials, state bureaucrats, and
technocrats saw science and technology as a catalyst of productivity. In the early 1980s, the
Chinese government encouraged peasant households to expand their production in one or several
farm animal species so that they could transition to modern production of scale. It expected that
households specialized in pig farming or geese farming, for example, could then modernize their
operations by adopting the Western intensive farming model. This explains the rationale
underlying the joint appeal of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council (1985) to the
local authorities for the latter to encourage the formation of specialized farming households and
farming villages.54 At about the same time, the Central Government decided that the country
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was ready to build intensive animal farming production bases. To the Chinese authorities and the
farming industry, the Western intensive farming model was more efficient and productive.
In the mid-1980s, a large number of intensive farms were built mostly in the suburbs of
China’s major urban centers and provincial capitals. These new concentrated farming facilities
served several purposes. First, they were the production sites that could quickly supply the urban
markets. Second, they were the fattening facilities to supply the local slaughterhouses. Third,
they bred and introduced from abroad fine foreign breeds for growing farms. Fourth, they were
sites for showcasing Western intensive farming techniques and for training purposes. Finally,
these intensive farms served as the “storage” or supplier of the national “pork reserve,” a
mechanism unheard of in any other country. Understandably, fluctuations of meat supply in
China, like oil supply in the industrialized nations, could affect consumer confidence and trigger
social instability.
In the 1990s, the Chinese government was more explicit in supporting farming operations of
scale. It moved to provide policy incentives for building animal feed plants, modernizing animal
drug plants, and supporting the import of foreign breeding stock. Local governments were even
more aggressive in supporting livestock and related businesses through tax breaks, preferential
land rental fees, and little or no requirements on labor and environmental protection. It was also
during this period that the Chinese government began to encourage sales of live farm animals
and products overseas. International cooperation in animal disease control and prevention also
received government attention. Paradoxically and not completely surprisingly, the outbreak of
SARS and the bird’s flu, epidemics caused partially by concentrated farming systems, hardened
the Chinese authorities’ determination to push for the industrialization of the production. The
Chinese authorities are yet to realize that farm animals in concentrated units are more vulnerable
to mass epidemic outbreaks. To the Chinese agricultural bureaucrats and the farming industry,
productivity is above any other considerations.
The Chinese government’s rural policies reviewed in this section succeeded in sending
important messages to the peasants. First, the nation’s food security could not depend on grain
production only. While agriculture is “an industry that is vital to social stability,” in the words of
the CCP’s former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, grain production and diversified non-grain
production had to receive equal attention. Importantly, diversified production was to be
encouraged rather than penalized. Second, relaxation of state control over price and market,

26

lifting of state ban on cattle slaughter, provision of feed grain and bonus farmland to livestock
farming households, and de-collectivization were all indispensable moves to reassure the farmers
that the government meant what it pronounced. Quite expectedly, these policies helped unleash a
new wave of entrepreneurial spirits among the peasants who were willing to invest in long-term
growth of animal farming. Specialized livestock farming households emerged in great numbers.
By the mid-1980s, livestock production had increased to a level prompting the Chinese
government to remove meat and dairy products from the state rationing system imposed since the
mid-1950s. While China had made impressive progress in food security by the early of the 1990s,
it however began to face a challenge of no less danger to social stability.
Intensive Farming and Consequences

The preceding section does not pretend to cover all the policies made by China’s reforming state
for promoting livestock production. The introduced policies are, however, some of the landmark
policy changes with far-reaching significance. Lifting price control, for example, was for
encouraging peasants to farm more animals. Opening markets was for the peasants to benefit
from increased production. Encouraging production intensification was for maximizing the gains
from adopting Western farming model and practices. As we have introduced earlier in this paper,
China’s livestock production has experienced a breathtaking growth and product structural
changes. In 1990, China surpassed the US as the world’s biggest meat producer. This is one of
the many areas that China succeeded in its “catch up” efforts during the reform era. Yet, like in
the industrialized nations, industrial animal farming and Western farming practices create
enormous environmental and human health problems. And the severity of the problems is still
unfolding.
Animal Cruelty, Disease Control and Environment

In European Union nations, Western farming practices are criticized for their adverse impact on
farm animal welfare. This criticism has been unknown to most if not all Chinese farmers. High
stocking density, a common site on Chinese intensive farms, makes disease spread like prairie
fire. According to a study, 42 of the 48 farms hardest hit by H5N1, a variant of avian influenza,
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in 2005 were concentrated farming units. 55 To prevent or control disease outbreaks, farms resort
to drugs. Little wonder that farm animals in China’s intensive farms are kept alive through drug
use until, in most cases, the last day on the farm. What is equally shocking to Chinese consumers
is the use of wide varieties of additives in commercial feed. These substances promote growth at
the expense of the farm animals and human health.
As our field study confirmed, Western farming practices are hugely popular in China because
of their value in promoting growth and productivity. Sow stalls are universally used in breeding
farms. This equipment severely limits sows’ freedom of movement and their ability to perform
many natural behaviors. Confined sows are not only physically exhausted, but also mentally
distressed. Being relentlessly milked by their piglets who have nothing else to do in the barren
pens, sows’ immune system could drop thus creating the need for drug intervention. Similarly,
mutilation causes long-term pain to the piglets making them susceptible to viral attack. Drug use
is again necessary on the farms. Living in barren pens, piglets resort to fighting to overcome
boredom. Injuries from fighting are an apparent reason for drug use. And, drugs are also used
before loading the livestock for the slaughterhouse to ensure that they do not die on the road.
Farm animal waste contaminates water and soil in the West. Its damage to environment in
China is even more serious. Untreated waste discharged from these farms constitutes a huge
environmental challenge.56 According to one study, livestock industry was responsible for 37%
of the waste discharge into China’s water systems. Its CO2 contribution exceeds the world
average contributing level of 18% to the global green house effect. Parts of the suburbs of most
provincial capitals are declared uninhabitable for human residents because of a high level of
methane discharge and other gaseous pollution. 57 Beijing and Shanghai have been moving
animal farms out to the nearby provinces or remote suburbs ending air pollution problems in the
vicinity of the metropolises but polluting the rural areas.58
Food Safety

Daily mortality on China’s factory farms, particularly broiler, laying hen, and duck farms, is no
small number. Relevant regulations require deep burial or other safe treatment of these dead
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animals. Yet, there have long been reports in China about discarded broilers, for example,
collected and made into roast chickens.59 Our field study confirmed the widespread violation by
farm owners, livestock trader,s and food processors regarding farm mortality disposal. Out of the
eight layer farms, three sold the dead chicken to their own employees who may in turn resell
them to restaurants or other food dealers. And, five of the seven pig farms disposed of dead pigs
to vendors who make a living collecting and processing dead farm animals.
It is, therefore, safe to say that most of the daily farm mortality in China finds its way to the
food market.60 According to a Chinese study, a significant portion of the meat products on the
market could hardly stand a standard drug residue test.61 Relevant regulations require the farmers
to stop using drugs to their livestock days before slaughter depending on the drug used. Yet, our
interviewees confirmed that most farms do not go by that rule. Local governments are not
motivated to enforce the regulations for fear of slowing down livestock production. As a result,
meat and dairy products with high drug residue and other substances are a constant concern to
the Chinese consumers. One study conducted in South China’s Guangzhou found that, out of the
200 samples of pork liver sold on the market, 68% were found to have pathological changes such
as cancerous cells in the very early stage of development caused by over-dose of drugs in the
pigs’ entire life cycle.62
As we have already mentioned, Chinese farms have been found using banned chemicals such
as Ractopamine, Salbutamol, Terbu-taline, and Clenbuterol, and other synthetic growth promoter,
to produce lean meat. These chemical compounds were found in 5% of the pork sold in Shanghai
in 2004. Pork contaminated with these chemicals was responsible for the hospitalization of some
300 people in the city in 2006.63 The tainted baby formula is the latest of food safety incident
involving the farm animal farming industry. What explains the stubbornness of the problem?
Profit drive of the businesses involved and government failure to enforce food safety regulations
have been identified by some scholars as the direct causes.64
Admittedly, Western farming model and technology are efficient in achieving quick results
in the shorted possible time. And, they are more productive compared with traditional farming
59

Shi, Wenxian. (2001); See also, Wu, Hui and Wei Tao. (2004).
CCTV. (2004).
61
LYXMJ. (2008).
62
HHHTAGRI. (2007).
63
Yu, Lihong and Wanf Wei. (2006).
64
SDXM. (2008).
60

29

methods. After adopting Western farming model and practices, livestock production has become
the fastest sector in Chinese agriculture. In 1990, China produced 30.42 million tons of meat,
doubling that of 1980. Fifteen years later, China’s meat output reached a record high of 78
million tons representing 29.26% of the world’s total. Per capita meat consumption in China hit
63 kilograms. 65 Although peasant household-based production continues to dominate pig
farming in sheer numbers, for example, factory farms contributed a higher and disproportionate
share (27% in 2005) to the total pork output. Shortage of meat supply is history.

Dietary Change and Public Health

In the reform era, China’s cereal-based diet has undergone noticeable changes. Ample supply of
farm animal products made it possible for Western fast food chains such as the McDonald’s to
build outlets in massive scale and at an unprecedented speed. Intake of larger amounts of animal
proteins is believed to be a major cause of the sudden rise of chronic illnesses. Today, an average
Chinese youth is taller than his or her parent generation. According to one study, 22% of the
adults in China are over-weight while 7.1% of them are obese. In major metropolises, as high as
30% and 12.3% of the adults are over-weight and obese. Compared with the data collected in
1992, by 2006, adults who were overweight and obese had gone up by 39% and 97%
respectively. Nationally, 8.1% of schoolchildren are obese. Ample supply of meat and dairy
products in recent years has encouraged a compensatory meat consumption attitude among those
who lived through the hard days of the pre-reform era. The dominance of meat, dairy, and fat
intake in daily diet is believed to be a contributing factor of weight increase in China.
Surprisingly, weight gains are reportedly quite even among both the urban and rural adults. 66
Weight gain is only the symptom of a changing dietary habit in China. Like in many other
developed countries, cases of infectious diseases have been steadily going down in China. In
contrast, chronic illnesses or “diseases of affluence” have been rising quickly. In 2002, there
were reportedly 134 million high blood pressure patients, an increase of 50% over that in 1980.67
Worse still, increased food supply has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in the number
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of cancer patients in China. According to a World Health Organization estimate, China has
become the second biggest country in the number of yearly new cases of cancer patients. 68 An
authoritative survey data also revealed that three million Chinese died of cancers in 2006, 100%
increase in cancer-related deaths over that in 1986. Deaths from cancers most directly linked to
over consumption of meat ranked fourth in number.69 Each and every modern farming practice
adopted on the Chinese farms creates opportunity for drug use to prevent disease outbreaks.
People today may not suffer from undernourishment as they were in the pre-reform era; yet they
are not necessarily healthier. When they are hospitalized, their body may be resistant to treatment
drugs due to years of overdose from drug tainted farm animal products.
Like other developmental states in East Asia, China has come to a juncture in development.
How can it sustain growth while starting to care about other important concerns such as
environmental protection and food safety? In essence, can China afford to continue the option of
“pollute first and clean up later”? Similarly, is China’s animal farming sustainable if it continues
to expand at the expense of animal welfare, environment, and human health?

Conclusions

China watchers worldwide have been amazed at the role of government policy in facilitating
stunning changes in China.70 This paper has explored the relations between the new policies of
the reforming Chinese state and growth of livestock production. In an effort to promote growth,
the Chinese reforming state has acted like other developmental states in the region. It has used
state policies to achieve several important objectives. First, government policies were enacted to
change the attitude of the peasants’ towards production. By de-criminalizing non-state and nongrain production, the Chinese government set forth a production enthusiasm never seen in the
pre-reform era. Second, government policies were made to effect change in the distribution of
livestock production in the country. By encouraging peasants in the grain-producing areas to
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engage in expanded farm animal farming, the Chinese government succeeded in moving
livestock farming east-ward and to areas with abundant surplus labor and abundant crop
byproducts. In the meantime, the state succeeded in causing a change in the product structure of
China’s livestock production. The dominance of pig farming has been eroded. Cattle and sheep
farming has been on the rise.
Third, the most fundamental change Chinese government policies have been pushing for is
transformation of production model. Peasant backyard farms still dominate animal farming in
absolute numbers. Yet, intensive farms are growing. Industrialization has been identified as the
future direction of the nation’s livestock production. The role of government policy in facilitating
desired changes in China has been widely recognized. The power of the policies lies, however, in
the fact that they have catered to the growth desire of the producers. Yet, it is this obsession with
growth that partially explains the lack of attention on issues ranging from environmental
degradation to food safety. Therefore, we believe that China’s reforming state is as much a cause
of the development ailments as part of a solution. Can China’s developmental state that sees
growth as the primary objective solve the nation’s sustainable development challenge? Or, has
mainland China come to a historical juncture to move beyond the politics of a developmental
state as Taiwan and South Korea did in the late 1980s?
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